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THE HYBRID DISPUTE: UNION CONCERTED
ACTION IN A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED
BOYCO'T
This Note focuses on union involvement in politically motivated protests and asks
whether the use of union weapons, such as strikers and boycotts, in disputes removed
from the traditional union context is governed by federal labor or antitrust laws.
Federal labor laws traditionally were designed to regulate disputes concerning the
relative bargainingpower of unions and management in setting terms and conditions
of employment. Federal antitrust laws do not cover concerted union action when
such conduct falls within the purview of the labor laws. While constitutionally pro-
tected conduct, such as politicalprotest and government petitioning, also is immune
from antitrust regulation, the relationship between this political activism and union
seff-help is unclear. This Note proposes a more active judicial rule, based on anti-
trust princpiles, to effectively regulate that union political action which utilizes tradi-
tional labor weapons.
INTRODUCTION
]JODERN, POLITICALLY conscious unions increasingly mobilize
their work forces in the pursuit of purely political or ethical
extra-union objectives. This type of action involves the coinci-
dence of labor weapons-concerted work stoppage and/or boy-
cotts with their incidental trade restraints on the flow of
goods-and an underlying motive unrelated to the terms and con-
ditions of employment. This conduct is thus a hybrid case be-
cause the boycott activity is of mixed composition and its
elements-participants, motive, and impact-involve different ar-
eas of the law. This Note analyzes this hybrid union conduct
under the labor and antitrust laws and specifies under what statu-
tory scheme, if any, this conduct falls.
Part I of the Note explores the background of political boy-
cotts in general, the increased politicization of American unions,
and the incidence of nonwork directed union action in the United
States.' Part II inquires into whether political protest by a labor
union is covered by the secondary boycott prohibitions2 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or whether such conduct
would be subject to collective bargaining provisions and orders to
arbitrate? Part III examines the hybrid activity as a possible anti-
1. See infra notes 5-31 and accompanying text.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
3. See infra notes 32-94 and accompanying text.
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trust violation.4 The Note concludes that the courts should ap-
proach the union litigant in a hybrid dispute as they would
approach any other political organization involved in a boycott.
Thus, the judicial restraint traditionally adopted by the federal
courts in cases involving labor unions would be minimized.
I. BACKGROUND
Political groups increasingly use boycotts to achieve social and
political goals. Unions generally have used strikes and work stop-
pages-boycotts-to improve the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. More recently, however, unions have begun to use the
boycott to achieve other than union-qua-union social and political
goals. Employers, seeking to stop this hybrid union action, have
questioned the legality of such conduct under the labor and anti-
trust laws.
A. The Use of Boycotts
The emergence of political groups in the late 1950's and 1960's,
such as the women's movement, civil rights activists, and con-
sumer protection groups, has prompted increasing attempts to ef-
fectuate social and political change through boycotts. The
4. See infra notes 95-152 and accompanying text.
5. Consumers have boycotted meat, supermarkets, grapes, canned iced tea, sugar,
soft drinks, slacks, lettuce, textiles, chocolate, Saran Wrap, tuna, and animal skins and furs.
Political action has included NOW's convention boycott to press for ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment, National Federation for Decency's call for boycott of ABC-
TV's "sleazy sex" programming, anti-abortionist boycott of March of Dimes because of its
funding for prenatal diagnostic programs, California Ku Klux Klan plan to "help whites"
by boycotting business unfriendly to the Klan, and the homosexual organizations' boycott
of Florida citrus products in retaliation for the anti-gay campaign of Anita Bryant. See
Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1131 n.4 (1980).
Boycott is defined by WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 264 (1961)
as follows:
[T]o 1: combine against (a person, employer, a group of persons, or a nation) in a
policy of non-intercourse for economic or political reasons: withhold wholly or
partly social or business intercourse from as an expression of disapproval or
means or coercion or 2: to engage in concerted refusal to have anything to do
with the products or services of (an employer) in order to force acceptance of
certain conditions desired by a union.
The origin of the word boycott can be traced to Captain Charles Boycott, an agent who
collected rents for a 19th century absentee English landlord. English landlords controlled
much property in Ireland and demanded exorbitant rents from the tenant farmers. Boycott
refused the farmers' payments, declaring them insufficient, and evicted several tenants.
The community retaliated with a policy of total economic and social isolation against the
rent collector. Despite his attempts to recruit imported labor, Boycott could not withstand
this isolation and was forced to return to England. D. LosMAN, INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC SANCTIONS 2 (1979).
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purpose and effect of boycotts on a nationwide or regional basis is
to isolate economically and stigmatize socially a particular sector
of society. Such effects are achieved by directing the boycott to-
ward a particular group or corporation which the activist finds of-
fensive for moral, religious, or political reasons. Boycotts often
result in immediate and serious financial harm to the target 6
which, in turn, prompts increasing judicial intervention in re-
sponse to private tort and antitrust claims.7
While consumer and political boycotts have significantly af-
fected United States domestic trade and commerce, the extension
of boycotts to the international trade zone has created further re-
strictions on the free flow of goods and services among nations.8
In the United States, both the federal government and private
groups have instigated concerted refusals to deal with nations
whose internal and foreign policies are dangerous, threatening, or
politically distasteful."
6. A 1963 civil rights boycott of retail merchants in Birmingham, Alabama cost the
merchants approximately $750,000 a week in lost business. An NAACP boycott of
merchants in Port Gibson, Mississippi resulted in business losses of approximately $1 mil-
lion. See Note, Political Boycott lActivity and the First Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 659,
659 (1978); Note, Secondary Consumer Boycotts, 54 U. DET. J. URa. L. 579 (1977).
7. See Missouri v. National Org. for Women (NOW), 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980);
Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1131 (1980). See generally
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955);
Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 685 (1979); Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Refusals to
Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247; Marcus, CivilRights and the Antitrust Laws, 18 U. CHI. L. REv.
171 (1951); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws?, 27 RtrroERs L.
REv. 773 (1974); Comment, Boycott:.4 Specjc Dqfnition Limits the Applicabili y of a Per Se
Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 818 (1977); Note, Use of Economic Sanctions by Private Groups:
lllegaliy Under the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (1962).
8. During World War II, the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions on Italy
in 1935 with Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and again in 1938 on Japan for bombing
Chinese cities. D. LosMAN, supra note 5, at 4. The Arab League instigated a boycott of
Zionist produce in 1944, "as long as their production in Palestine might lead to the realiza-
tion of Zionists political aims." Id. at 49 (citing Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League: Ten
Years of Struggle," 1954 INTERNATIONAL CONCILLIATION, 383, at 421). In 1948, the USSR,
with its satellites, expelled Yugoslavia from a socialist-bloc regional trade and planning
association, the Council on Mutual Economic Aid. In 1960, the Organization of American
States invoked sanctions on the Dominican Republic for alleged intervention in Venezula.
D. LOSMAN, supra, at 4.
9. During the American colonial period, many colonists refused to purchase certain
British goods as a political protest. Later, the Jefferson administration implemented an
official embargo against Britain. D. LosMAN, supra, note 5, at 2. Castro's rise to power in
Cuba in the late 1950's and the decaying U.S.-Cuban political relationship culminated in an
official embargo on exports to Cuba. Id. at 21. In the post-World War II era, under the
Export Control Act, the United States abstained from trade with several other communist
nations for years. Id. at 5. In July 1968, the United States formally joined with Britain and
the United Nations in a total embargo on all exports to Rhodesia in response to the Rhode-
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In view of the success of boycotts in isolating and injuring in-
dustries and manufacturers, it is not surprising to find American
labor unions mobilizing their ranks in concerted action against
employers allegedly maintaining unfair labor practices and eco-
nomic policies unfavorable to the workers.' ° The classic strike or
work stoppage is actually a boycott in which the workers con-
certedly withdraw their services from the employer to affect a par-
ticular goal. In employing traditional concerted action, the labor
union almost exclusively acts in a dispute which is both regulated
by the NLRA and concerned with the terms and conditions of
workers' employment. The union exercises economic warfare
against employers to pressure them into accepting their proposals,
and in so doing, carries on self-help which is limited and regulated
by federal law.11
In recognition of the potential for severe economic harm in a
mass labor boycott, Congress, in section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the NLRA, limited the ability of a labor
union to extend its boycotts and work stoppages beyond its pri-
mary employer.12 In so doing, Congress expressed concern for in-
nocent, neutral parties unconnected with the union's interest and
objectives, yet harmed by the union's boycott.
B. Union Politicization
With an increased awareness of national and international
sian white minority government's unilateral declaration of independence. Id. at 93. Inter-
estingly, the originator of the term boycott (Captain Boycott) also was embroiled in an
international political dispute. See supra note 5.
10. See generally National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967) ("Hot
cargo" agreements); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964)
(product picketing); Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961)
("reserved gates"); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951);
Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("ally
doctrine").
11. Labor Management Relations (raft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(4)(B) (1976).
12. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). To come within the lan-
guage of § 8(b)(4)(B), it is sufficient that the union engaged in the prohibited activity dis-
rupts the business relationships of a neutral employer with the express purpose of forcing
that employer to demand a change in the labor policy of the person or corporation with
whom it does business. See Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMR4: A Path Through the
Swamp, 19 KAtN. L. REv. 651, 657 (1971). The limitation of the broad language of § 8
(b)(4)(A) to "secondary" situations was in "conformity with the dual congressional objec-
tives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending
employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others
from pressures in controversies not their own." NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
[Vol. 32:463
THE HYBRID DISPUTE
politics, labor unions are markedly willing to boycott for purely
political purposes. In the last half century, American politics has
witnessed the emergence of activist unions on the legislative level
and in the work place.
As special interest groups in the United States have evolved
into major political forces in the legislative process, the labor
union has been, and continues to be, an active and visible source
of political support. Labor endorsements of political candidates
and union contributions, in cash and in kind, to political parties
are critical in governmental elections.' 3 Furthermore, union lob-
byists who have earned a reputation for skill and effectiveness
rarely confine their efforts to issues which concern union members
qua union members.
In 1974, the high priority issues of AFL-CIO lobbyists were
national security, the preservation of democratic government, the
impeachment of Richard Nixon, reform of the housing program,
full funding of poverty programs, consumer protection, increased
funds for education and environmental protection, improvement
of veterans programs, and the direct election of the President.'
4
Vigorous lobbying by the AFL-CIO was critical in the adoption of
Medicare, the food stamps program, the Economic Opportunity
Act, and the Trade Expansion Act. 5 None of these issues, how-
ever, are classic labor concerns, such as proposed statutory re-
straints on strikes and concerted actions, Occupation Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) regulations,' 6 capital productivity, unemploy-
ment, and national trade. '7
13. In 1968, labor unions distributed 118 million leaflets, provided 638 telephone
banks and 24,611 people to run them, and 72,225 canvassers. 117 CONG. REC. 6641 (1971)
(remarks of Sen. Fannin). Most of these efforts were made by the AFL-CIO's Committee
on Political Education (COPE). Labor spent $1 million in the 1974 midterm elections. 33
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1538 (1975). In 1976, Senator Goldwater released estimates that
unions spent $3,222,155 on Senate elections and $2,449,170 on House elections. During
these elections, COPE provided 120,000 volunteers, 20,000 telephones, and used a computer
bank listing 1I million union members in 45 states to identify potential support for its
candidates. 122 CONG. REC. 3347-49 (1976).
One commentator contends that the willingness of voters to formulate their election
choices based on issues, instead of party affiliation, and the unions' generation of public
awareness of the candidates whose stands on issues they favor, have given unions greater
ability to influence election outcomes. G. WILSON, UNIONS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL POLI-
ncs 35 (979).
14. G. WILSON, supra note 13, at 67 (citing AFL-CIO, Labor Looks at Congress, 1973,
at 111 (1974)).
15. G. WILSON, supra note 13, at 73.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
17. Unions continue to be concerned about the amount of foreign goods being im-
19821
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C. The Hybrid Dispute
While labor lobbyists have been relatively inactive on issues of
foreign policy,'" the AFL-CIO and the International Longshore-
men's Association (ILA) have voiced expressly hawkish policy
views toward the USSR and other communist nations. Moreover,
the AFL-CIO and the United Steel Workers, in addition to advo-
cating government policies through lobbyists and candidate sup-
port, 19 have intervened directly in foreign affairs by providing
financial and organizational support to noncommunist unions
abroad in competing with their communist rivals.2 0 This recent
politicization of American unions in the foreign policy sphere has
been evidenced by labor's use of traditional union weaponry for
other than union-qua-union political purposes.
Factually, hybrid conduct involves a union work stoppage in
sectors of an industry which employs parties and produces prod-
ucts which the union finds politically distasteful. The most recent
example of such conduct, which produced the greatest trade re-
straints and judicial involvement, concerned the ILA's refusal to
handle goods of both employers trading with communist nations2'
and countries hostile to ILA members.2 2 This recent dispute be-
ported into the United States and the competitive stance of American made products
abroad as bearing on the level of productivity and employment in certain domestic indus-
tries. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974 §§ 1-613, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976). See particularly
sections 203, 221-224, 231-238 of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2019-2024 (1976),
which provide for "adjustment assistance" for workers who have suffered increased unem-
ployment due to decreased sales of production in firms harmed by increase of foreign im-
ports of competitive products. See also accounts of U.A.W. & Ford Motor Company's
petition before the U.S. International Trade Commission urging import restrictions for
Japanese automobiles. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1980, at DI, col. 6; id., Nov. 11, 1980, at AL, coL
3; Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1980, at 3, col. 1; No to Curbs on Japanese Cars, TIME, Nov. 24,
1980, at 86.
18. G. WILSON, supra note 13, at 81.
19. Id. at 128.
20. Id. at 129.
21. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the ILA refused to work vessels
engaged in trade with Cuba in an attempt to eliminate any United States-Cuban commer-
cial activity. NLRB v. ILA (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964). In response to
the taking of the United States embassy by Iranian revoluntionaries in Tehran in 1979, the
ILA dock workers similarly refused to unload any Iranian goods at United States ports.
Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1979, at 3, col. 4. In January 1980, the ILA instigated a concerted
refusal to work any ships handling Russian goods or destined for the USSR in protest of
the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. ILA, 102
S.Ct. 2673 (1982), ILA v. Allied Int'l Inc., 102 S.Ct. 1656 (1982); Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d
445 (5th Cir. 1980); Walsh v. ILA, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass.), vacatedsub nom. Walsh v.
AFL-CIO Local 799, 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980). See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text.
22. The ILA boycotted Bahamian ships to protest the Bahamian government's incar-
[Vol. 32:A63
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tween the ILA and importers and traders of Russian products is a
paradigm case which illustrates the conduct, motivations, and
problems of the hybrid boycott.
2 3
On January 9, 1980, Thomas Gleason, president of the ILA,
issued a directive instructing union members to cease handling
Russian cargo as a political protest of the Russian invasion of Af-
ghanistan. Consequently, ILA hiring halls refused to accept work
assignments or refer workers to ships handling Russian goods or
destined for the USSR. The directive stated that the workers were
upset and that they refused to "continue the business as usual pol-
icy so long as the Russians insist[ed] on being international bully
boys."'24 Importers and traders of Russian products as well as ex-
porters of United States goods to the USSR discovered that the
ILA would not handle their cargo at any American port. At no
time, however, did the union establish picket lines or prevent
other employees from working.
Allied International, which was engaged in the import,
purchase, and sale of Russian wood products, filed charges with
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) alleging that the
ILA had organized a secondary boycott in violation of sections
8(b)(4)(B)(i) and 8(b)(4)(B)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).25 The District Court of Massachusetts denied the
Board's request for an injunction pending the unfair labor prac-
tice charge. On appeal, the First Circuit held that a previous dis-
trict court determination26 that union political boycotts were not
ceration of union members for allegedly fishing inside Bahamian territorial waters. Har-
rington & Co. v. ILA, 356 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
23. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA, 102 S.Ct. 2673 (1982); ILA v. Allied Int'l,
Inc., 102 S.Ct. 1656 (1982); Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980); Walsh v. ILA,
488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass.), vacatedsub nom. Walsh v. AFL-CIO Local 799, 630 F.2d 864
(1st Cir. 1980).
24. Walsh, 488 F. Supp. at 526.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i), (ii)(B) (1976). Allied alleged that the union violated the
Act by preventing Allied's stevedoring company, Clark, from doing business with Water-
man Steamship Lines, a cargo transport firm. Allied further argued that the union's secon-
dary boycott forced Clark to cease doing business with Allied, Waterman to cease doing
business with Allied, and that all three firms were prevented from doing business with the
USSR. 488 F. Supp. at 525-26.
26. Baldovin v. ILA, No. 80-259 (S.D. Tex. filed Feb. 15, 1980). In a companion case,
Mack v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980), the union appealed from an order of the District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia, which granted an injunction under § 10(l) of the
NLRA enjoining the union from refusing to work in the ports of Savannah and Brunswick,
Georgia based on grievances concerning the shipment of cargo to the Soviet Union. Under
§ 10(), if the regional director has "reasonable cause to believe that such [secondary boy-
cott] charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall. . . petition any United
19821
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subject to the NLRA's jurisdiction on the grounds that such con-
duct was not in commerce was res judicata as to all subsequent
cases since the injunction involved work stoppages at every
United States port and the national activities of the ILA.
In a separate action against the ILA,27 Allied International
sought a private damage remedy under section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,28 alleging that the ILA's conduct was
an illegal secondary boycott. Allied International also sought in-
junctive and monetary relief under the Sherman Act,29 alleging
that the ILA's concerted refusal to deal resulted in a restraint of
trade. The District Court of Massachusetts held that the union's
concered refusal to deal, while not falling within the labor ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, was nevertheless not a restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act. The court based its holding on the
rationale that the antitrust laws were intended to regulate business
rather than political activity.3" The court concluded, therefore,
that the defendants had not engaged in a restraint of trade as de-
fined by the Sherman Act.3 '
On appeal to the First Circuit, the court affirmed the lower
court's holdings on the antitrust violation, as well as on the juris-
dictional issue, holding the union's boycott to be "in commerce"
under the NLRA.32 However, the court of appeals found that the
ILA boycott was within the section 8(b)(4) prohibition of secon-
dary boycotts despite its political purpose, and was furthermore
unprotected by the first amendment, and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
II. THE LABOR LAWS
Under federal labor law, a hybrid dispute may be resolved by
following two courses of action under separate, but interrelated,
statutory schemes. An employer may file a secondary boycott
charge with the Board which then may seek an injunction in fed-
eral court to prevent further boycotting. This avenue of redress
requires that the controversy constitute a labor dispute and be "in
States district court. . . for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of
the Board with respect to such matter." 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1976) (emphasis added).
27. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'd in part, 640 F.2d
1368 (lst Cir. 1981), aI'd, 102 S.Ct. 1656 (1982).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1976).
30. 492 F. Supp. at 338.
31. Id. at 339.
32. 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981).
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commerce" under the secondary boycott provisions.3 3 Further-
more, the Board must assume the burden of proving that the dis-
pute is in fact secondary conduct-a classification undefined by
the NLRA.
Alternatively, if a union is striking in violation of a collective
bargaining agreement, an employer may seek a Boys Markets in-
junction in federal court against the work stoppage and an order
to arbitrate.34 The success of a Boys Markets injunction, however,
is related intimately to both the scope of the federal court's power
to compel arbitration and the extent to which the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act35 prohibits federal court injunctions.
The outcome of litigation involving a hybrid dispute generally
will depend on which claim an employer chooses to assert. Al-
though the analysis under the NLRA parallels that under the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act with respect to the interpretation of a labor
dispute, a finding that such a dispute is absent from the hybrid
case may have a radically different impact under the two Acts.
With respect to the commerce and arbitrability issues, a single
strike will involve separate inquiries under the two labor provi-
sions, and the different focus, purposes, and judicial interpreta-
tions of the separate laws will determine the outcome of the case.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
The employer initiates redress for a union's illegal conduct
under the NLRA by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board.36 The Board, in a case alleging secondary conduct, seeks a
federal court injunction against the union boycott.37 The Board
then assigns the case to an administrative law judge who investi-
gates the complaint and adjudicates the claim, making findings of
fact and interpreting the relevant case and statutory law.38 The
NLRA provides for judicial review of the Board's final decision in
33. See infra notes 39-59 and accompanying text. See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)
(1976) (unfair labor practice to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce. ... ); id. § 151 (purpose of the NLRA to
protect union exercise of freedom of association "for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection").
34. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See also
R. GoRmAN, LABOR LAW 608-18 (1977) (analysis of the Boys Markets decision and its
implications).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
36. R. GORMAN, supra note 33, at 7.
37. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(j), (), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) (1976).
38. R. GORMAN, supra note 33, at 8.
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the appropriate circuit court.39
In the hybrid dispute, an employer typically brings a secon-
dary boycott charge alleging that the union, by its work stoppage,
is attempting to force the employer to cease doing business with
the particular parties who the union finds politically distasteful. If
the union objects to and is boycotting the products handled by a
third party who is dealing with the primary employer and does
not object to the political activities of the primary employer itself,
a prima facie case of secondary activity arguably would be
established.
1. Labor Disputes
The NLRA was enacted to regulate the conduct of people en-
gaged in labor disputes.4" A prerequisite to Board jurisdiction,
therefore, is that the work stoppage pursued by the union for non-
commercial and political reasons constitutes a "labor dispute" as
defined by the Act4" and interpreted by the courts. The Act de-
fines labor dispute in section 2(9):
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concern-
ing terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.42
The leading case which first interpreted labor dispute in a hy-
brid context, and which has been the basis for. the most recent
holdings in hybrid cases, is NLRB v. ILA (Ocean Shipping).43
Ocean Shipping involved the ILA's refusal to load or unload any
ship which was being used for trade with Cuba. The union in-
tended this action as a political boycott designed to cut off trade
39. Seegenerall, NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160() (1976) (allowing "persons aggrieved
by a final order of the Board" to seek review in a federal court of appeals); NLRB v.
Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961) (scope of judicial review and a court's
ability to review both questions of law and of mixed law and fact discussed).
40. NLRB v. ILA (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1964) (citing Marine
Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (1960)).
41. NLRA § 13(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976) states: "The Board . . . may . . .
decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving. . . employers, where...
the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction." See id. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1976), which refers to "labor
disputes affecting commerce" which may be resolved by a state agency to whom the Board
has agreed to cede jurisdiction.
42. NLRA § 2(9), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976).
43. 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
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completely with the Cubans. The Board brought suit to enforce a
cease and desist order against the ILA for alleged violations of the
secondary boycott provisions.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the injunction
sought under section 10(l) of the NLRA, holding that the ILA pol-
icy calculated to eliminate trade with Cuba constituted political
conduct and not a dispute grounded in terms and conditions of
employment." In rejecting the Board's notion that "whenever a
union calls a work stoppage or refuses to supply labor there is a
'labor dispute,' 4 the court explicitly distinguished situations
where the union seeks to alter conditions of employment from
cases where the union uses traditional concerted action to elimi-
nate trade with a distant third party on purely political grounds.
The court's holding in Ocean Shirping is consistent with the
literal terms of the statute. This jurisdictional limitation, however,
insulates the union which engages in secondary conduct 46 sup-
ported by ulterior (not labor-related) motives. This effect is incon-
sistent perhaps with one of the purposes of section 8(b)(4)-the
protection of neutral parties from economic insulation and harm.
Such conduct, therefore, arguably should be enjoined because the
employer, harmed by the political boycott, is as helpless to remedy
the political dispute as it is to remedy a labor dispute when the
union targets a primary employer with secondary pressure. 47
44. Accord Danielson v. Fur Dressers Local 2F, 411 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Danielson held (citing Ocean Shipping) that picketing by a leather workers' union of a fur
importer who imported only processed skins, in protest of Argentina's law requiring that
80% of exported skins be processed, was not a labor dispute.
45. 332 F.2d at 996.
46. "The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the
employer who alone is party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern
in it." Local 501, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.) (L.
Hand, J.), aj7'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1950). See also Goetz, supra note 12. Crucial to identifying a
secondary boycott is pinpointing the secondary employer.
He is one with whom the union has no dispute about his labor relations with his
employees. These are the neutrals the statute was designed to protect because
they do not have it within their own power to resolve the underlying dispute ...
The union's only dispute with them-if it can be called a dispute-concerns their
dealings with another employer against whom the union wants to exert indirect
pressure in order to change the latter's. . . policies.
Id. at 657-58.
47. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 428 (1948); H. CON.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 42 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 546 (1948). Senator Pepper, in con-
testing the passage of§ 8(b)(4), asserted the "right of an American citizen to speak his mind
to his neighbor, to ask him to help him in a common humane enterprise," and thought that
the breadth of § 8(b)(4) outlawed any boycott, "no matter how legitimate the objective of
473
CASE WESTERAN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2. In Commerce Under Section 8(b)(4)
In addition to the requirement that the controversy before the
Board be a labor dispute, the NLRA also requires that the hybrid
dispute be "in commerce."4 8 In light of the congressional purpose
behind the secondary boycott provisions, judicial decisions have
defined commerce more narrowly than the constitutional in com-
merce requirement.49
The secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA apply to any
activities directed at individuals employed by a "person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce .. ."10 This
provision supports the general jurisdictional limitations of the
NLRA to activities "affecting commerce."'" In addition to this
overall jurisdictional limitation, section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA simi-
larly limits the Board's jurisdiction to restrain and remedy secon-
dary boycotts to parties "engaged in commerce" and industries
"affecting commerce."5 2 Although the cases have demonstrated53
factually that boycotts which occur in the hybrid case have imme-
diate chilling effects on interstate and international trade, within
the context of section 8(b)(4), the hybrid dispute has been held not
to be in commerce.
In Baldovin v. ILA, 54 a regional director of the Board brought
suit under section 10(/) of the NLRA in response to charges filed
by the Kansas and Texas Farm Bureaus of the American Farm
Bureau Federation because local members of the ILA had refused
to refer workers to load grain bound for the USSR aboard a Bel-
gian ship.5 The district court refused the injunction on the
ground that the dispute was not in commerce and thus, the Board
had no jurisdiction. 6 The Baldovin district court action was con-
solidated on appeal to the Fifth Circuit with Mack v. ILA, 7
the boycott was." Senator Pepper urged that a "distinction should have been made predi-
cated on what the objective of the boycott is." 93 CONG. REc. 4,324 (1947), reprinted in I
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at
1108-09 (1948).
48. NLRA § 8(b)(4)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(i) (1976).
49. Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
50. NLRA § 8(b)(4)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (1976).
51. Id. §§ 1, 2(b), 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(6), 157 (1976).
52. Id. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
53. See infra notes 120 & 128 and accompanying text.
54. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 448.
56. Id.
57. 104 L.R.R.M. 2892 (S.D. Ga.), vacated, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
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which involved the union's appeal from an order of the district
court granting a section 10(l) injunction.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that for the purposes of the secon-
dary boycott provisions, a hybrid dispute involving a union's
grievance with a foreign nation did not affect commerce. The
court emphasized that the purpose of the in commerce require-
ment in the secondary boycott was to narrow the labor dispute
into a confrontation between primary opponents that could be
remedied by a domestic authority.58 In essence, an injunction to
cease the secondary conduct would not resolve the ultimate union
grievance, but would merely assuage the incidental effects on the
importers-themselves innocent of any politically distasteful con-
duct. The prohibition of secondary boycotts, therefore, did not
extend to work stoppages based on a union's desire to voice polit-
ical protests and avoid "giving aid and comfort to a nation whose
policies it consider[ed] inimical."59
To determine when conduct by a union which disrupts com-
merce does not affect commerce legally, it is necessary to recall
that Baldovin formulates its test according to the purpose of the
mandatory injunction provision in section 10(l) and the NLRA in
general, and not according to the actual impact of the work stop-
page. To be in commerce under section 8(b)(4), the union's objec-
tives must be focused on affecting employer decisionmaking on
terms and conditions of employment which the NLRA was
designed to regulate, and the protest must be remediable by the
primary employer.60
However, in a suit for private damages filed by an importer of
Russian wood products, the Supreme Court held that the activities
of the importers, shippers, and stevedore companies were "in
commerce" within the meaning of section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.
In ILA v. Allied International, Inc. ,61 the Court distinguished the
positions of the union and American importers in that case from
58. 626 F.2d at 450.
59. Id. It is interesting to note that the court, in substance, characterized the union's
conduct as secondary. The ILA did not seek to affect the labor relations of employers with
whom it had contracts, but rather was withholding services from neutral parties, the im-
porters, to register a public outcry against Russian foreign policy and continued trade with
that nation. Id. at 449.
60. See Windward Shipping, Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 114-15
(1974). In Windward Shipping, the ILA picketed against the loading of Liberian vessels
because the wages paid non-American seamen aboard those vessels were "substandard to
those of American seamen." Id. at 107.
61. 102 S.Ct. 1656 (1982). See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
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the conduct of the litigants in a prior line of cases which had ar-
ticulated a general policy of restraint in applying U.S. laws to for-
eign maritime operations. In Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo,62 the Court held that picketing by an American union in
support of the striking foreign crew of a foreign-flag ship was not
covered by the NLRA, and the activities of the foreign vessel were
not "in commerce" on the basis that the labor laws are not
designed to resolve disputes between "nationals of other countries
operating ships under foreign laws."
63
Similarly, in Windward Shipping Ltd v. American Radio Asso-
ciation,6 a U.S. union picketed foreign ships in protest of the low
wages received by the foreign seamen and the adverse impact
which such wages had on members of the U.S. maritime union.
The Court held that the union's conduct was not "in commerce
under the labor laws where the picketing was intended to raise the
operation costs of foreign vessels, and where the conduct had
"more than a negligible impact on the 'maritime operations' of
... foreign ships."65 In sum, like those principles limiting the
extraterritorial reach of American antitrust laws, the above cases
demonstrate that an American union's conduct will not be "in
commerce" when it is designed solely to affect the maritime opera-
tions of foreign ships.
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Allied International distin-
guished the ILA's Russian boycott from similar actions in its prior
cases, and deemed the policy basis behind this line of precedent to
be inapplicable to the Longshoremen's conduct. First, the union's
refusal to unload the Russian goods did not affect the maritime
operations of a foreign vessel. The union was not attempting to
improve the working conditions of foreign workers or extending
benefits enjoyed by American employees and employers under the
NLRA to foreign seamen and shipowners. Furthermore, the
ILA's Russian boycott involved and affected only American na-
tionals. As the Court of Appeals explained, the "drama" was
"played out by an all-American cast."'66 The judicial tradition of
restraint in applying American laws to ships of a foreign country
was thus inapplicable where "an American union. . . ordered its
members not to work for an American stevedore which. . . con-
62. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
63. Id. at 143, quoted in Allied Int'l, 102 S.Ct. at 1661.
64. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
65. Id. at 114-15.
66. 640 F.2d at 1374.
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tracted to service an American ship carrying goods of an Ameri-
can importer."'67
3. Substantive Analysis of the Secondary Hybrid Boycott
Although the jurisdiction of the Board is questionable in a hy-
brid dispute, several courts have addressed the substantive claim
of secondary conduct.6" The federal prohibition in section 8(b)(4)
against secondary boycotts provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents: (i) to engage in ... or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an indus-
try affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to ... handle or work or any goods
* . . or to perform any services; ... (ii) ... where ... an
object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to
cease doing business with any other person...
Secondary conduct by unions, however, is not defined by the stat-
ute or legislative history.70 This inquiry has been left to the courts
to determine on a case-by-case basis which has resulted in con-
flicting standards, vague linedrawing, and judicial hairsplitting.71
The rudiments of a secondary boycott generally exist where a
neutral party, unrelated to the employment relationship, suffers
the effects of a boycott because of a union's dispute with its em-
67. Id. at 1372; 50 U.S.L.W. at 4405.
68. See, e.g., Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. ILA (Ocean
Shipping), 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964); Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass.
1980), rev'd in part, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981), af'd, 102 S.Ct. 1656 (1982); Walsh v. ILA,
488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass.), vacatedsub nonz. Walsh v. AFL-CIO Local 799, 630 F.2d 864
(1st Cir. 1980); Danielson v. Fur Dressers, 411 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Penello v.
ILA, 227 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1964).
69. NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
70. During the debates surrounding the enactment of §8(b)(4), Senator Taft remarked
in response to queries regarding what conduct should be deemed secondary, "Our commit-
tee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference
between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have broadened the provision deal-
ing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice." 93 CONG. REC.
4,323 0947) reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1106 (1948).
71. No cosmic principles announce the existence of secondary conduct, condemn
it as an evil, or delimit its boundaries. These tasks were first undertaken by
judges, intermixing metaphysics with their notions of social and economic policy.
And the common law of labor relations has created no concept more elusive than
that of "secondary" conduct; it has drawn no line more arbitrary, tenuous, and
shifting than those separating "primary" from "secondary" activities.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386-87 (1969).
See also Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB (General Elec-
tric), 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).
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ployer.7 2 The classic secondary case is where a union coerces neu-
tral employers to cease doing business with the primary employer,
with whom the union has its dispute, by preventing the neutral
parties from obtaining goods or services necessary for their busi-
nesses.7 3 The classic statement of secondary conduct, however,
poses a problem when the party alleging the secondary coercion is
the only employer present in the dispute.
The hybrid dispute presents a situation where the putative pri-
mary employer incurs damages resulting from a union's dispute
with a neutral, nonemployer. The classic secondary pattern,
therefore, is reversed: instead of having neutral parties bear the
impact of conduct calculated to satisfy the union's objectives with
a primary employer, the union in a hybrid dispute is using pri-
mary pressure to seek goals beyond the scope of the employee-
employer relationship. Yet, the union still pressures a party, albeit
the primary employer, who is unable to mollify the union's griev-
ance because the core objective of the dispute still is removed
from the place of the boycott impact. Arguably, this conduct
should fall within the spirit of section 8(b)(4) since the union has
created a schism in the dispute of conciliation and resolution pro-
cess by exerting economic pressure on a party unable to affect that
conciliation.
There is some dispute over whether a controversy with the pri-
mary employer is a prerequisite to a secondary boycott. While
some courts have ignored the broad terms of the statute and re-
quired that the union be involved in a dispute with its employer,7 4
other courts, emphasizing congressional concern for the protection
of neutral parties from outside disputes, have awarded relief with-
out a showing of a union grievance with the primary employer.75
72. See Cushman, Secondary Boycotts andthe Taft-Hartley Law, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV.
109 (1954); Goetz, supra note 12. See also Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes
andBoycotts-Another Chapter, 59 COLO. L. REV. 125 (1959); Lesnick, The Gravamen ofthe
Secondary Boycott, 62 COLO. L. REV. 1363 (1962); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary
Boycotts: the Reach of NLRAI §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1000 (1965); Ross,. An
Assessment of the Landrum-Griffin Act's Secondary Boycott Amendments to the Taft-Hartley
Act, 22 LAB. L.J. 675 (1971); St. Antoine, What Makes Secondary Boycotts Secondary?, 11
LAB. L. DEv. 5 (1965); Note, Picketing andPublicity Under Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA4, 73
YALE L.J. 1265 (1964).
73. See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); NLRB v.
Denver Bldg & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
74. See, e.g., Mishara Constr. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 554 F.2d
488 (1st Cir. 1977).
75. See, e.g., Walsh v. ILA, 488 F. Supp. at 530 (citing National Maritime Union v.
NLRB, 346 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
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Thus, in a hybrid dispute, there is the possibility that the absence
of a union grievance with its employer would not pose an obstacle
to finding a secondary boycott. A union's political protest alone,
manifested through a boycott, might be a proper subject for a sec-
tion 8(b)(4) charge.
Ironically, considerations leading to the conclusion that a dis-
pute is not a labor dispute or not in commerce under the NLRA,
such as the political nature of the union's motives, militate in
favor of concluding that the hybrid boycott is prohibited secon-
dary conduct. The Fifth Circuit in Baldovin paraphrased the
Supreme Court's explanation of the primary-secondary dichot-
omy in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB7 6
as follows: The touchstone is "whether the union's concern is with
the labor relations of the employer against whom its pressures are
directed vis-a-vis its own employees (protected 'primary' activity)
or whether the activity is 'tactically calculated to satisfy union
objectives elsewhere' (prohibited 'secondary' activity)."7 7 Where
the union is engaged in a work stoppage calculated to satisfy
objectives elsewhere, the union's motivations may prevent the is-
suance of an injunction because the conduct may not be in com-
merce or a labor dispute. This remoteness of the union objectives,
however, would be the basis of traditionally classifying the activ-
ity as secondary.
The Baldovin court, applying the National Woodwork test,
deemed the hybrid case to present a classic secondary boycott, yet
denied jurisdiction on interpretive commerce-related grounds:
The stevedoring, shipping, exporting or importing companies
and all other persons doing business in the port of Houston and
in other ports along the east and gulf coasts are completely neu-
tral with regard to the ILA's dispute with the Soviet Union.
The ILA boycott, therefore, is secondary within the meaning of
the Act. It violates the purpose of the secondary boycott ban:
to compel the union to confront the employer with whom it has
its real or primary dispute pursuant to the usual procedures of
the NLRA.78
With respect to the same boycott of Russian work assignments,
the acts of the ILA were considered by the district court in Walsh
v. 1L4 79 to be a primary boycott of Russian goods with incidental
76. 386 U.S. 612, 644-45 (1967).
77. Baldovin, 626 F.2d at 449.
78. Id.
79. 488 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Mass. 1980). While the First Circuit held that the
Baldovin ruling in the Fifth Circuit was res judicata as to that and subsequent suits, the
1982]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
effects on the employers dealing in such goods. Citing National
Woodwork, the court, while not specifically mentioning the first
amendment, vaguely referred to the value of union political ex-
pression without any analysis of why this value should outweigh
the congressional purpose to protect neutral parties. Thus, the
union's refusal to accept work assignments on political grounds
without pickets, but with the express disclaimer that it seeks to
induce a strike of the importer's other employees, was held not to
be a secondary boycott, even though it produced the effects of
traditional secondary conduct.
The crucial factor in determining that secondary conduct does
not exist seems to be the availability of alternative sources of labor
with which importers can continue their business and still permit
the union to exercise its right of free expression. 0 Alternative la-
bor enables the employer to avoid the economic harm which the
secondary boycott sections were meant to remedy.8 1 Thus, the
union's work stoppage as an expression of political distaste for an
offensive action escapes classification as secondary conduct if the
importer can freely recruit other nonunion members for those
asignments which the union has refused. Where the union action,
however, is expressly designed to persuade or results in coercion
of other workers to refuse work for the same importers or ship-
pers, the union ought to be in violation of section 8(b)(4).
However, in ILA v. Allied International Inc. ,82 the Supreme
Court sustained the holding of the Court of Appeals8 3 that the
Fifth Circuit ruling on the secondary boycott claim was dicta. The controlling issue was
whether the union's activity was in commerce under the NLRA.
80. See NLRB v. ILA (Ocean Shipping), 332 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1964). Ocean
Shipping addressed the same concerns and concluded that the mere refusal to refer em-
ployees for work assignments, absent strikes, pickets, or pressure tactics, was not secondary
conduct. Id.
81. Where an employer remains free to recruit other workers, no damage claim under
§ 303 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), should be permitted against the union. Since
the employer is able to, and indeed, under a contractual analysis obligated to, mitigate
damages, any real economic harm flowing to the employer could have been avoided and
should not suffice as the basis for a damage suit. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336(1)
(1932). Extending this concept further, once the employer's ability to continue production is
impaired by union pickets or pressure on other workers, a § 303 suit becomes an appropri-
ate vehicle for redressing secondary conduct which cannot be remedied with equitable de-
vices. The damage suit provision relates only to the rationale that the secondary boycott
provisions are designed to prevent economic harm to neutral parties which flows from
conduct beyond their control. These actions do not relate to the other basis for a § 10(/)
injunction-forcing the primary employer and union into the conciliation process, a task
which is beyond the capacity of the courts in a hybrid dispute.
82. 102 S.Ct. 1656 (1982). See supra notes 25-32 & 61-67 and accompanying text.
83. 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981).
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ILA boycott was within section 8(b)(4)'s prohibition of secondary
boycotts, despite its political purpose. Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, in language harkening back to the National Wood-
work standard, found the union's conduct to fall within the literal
terms of section 8(b)(4).
The ILA has no dispute with Allied, Waterman, or Clark. It
does not seek any labor objective from these employers. Its
sole complaint is with the foreign and military policy of the
Soviet Union. As understandable and even commendable as
the ILA's ultimate objectives may be, the certain effect of its
action is to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers. And
it is just such a burden, as well as widening industrial strife,
that the secondary boycott provisions were designed to
prevent.84
Furthermore, the Court rejected the union's argument that the
Russian boycott was not "secondary" because its object was not to
halt business between the importers, shippers, and stevedore com-
panies but merely to free ILA members from the "morally repug-
nant duty of handling Russian goods."85 Rather, the Court
imputed the forbidden intent under section 8(b)(4) to pressure sec-
ondary or neutral employers to any union boycotting products
whose sale constituted a major source of profit for the company.
The Court formulated a "forseeability" test for assessing damages
flowing from a secondary boycott.
[W]hen a purely secondary boycott reasonably can be expected
to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss, the
pressure on secondary parties must be viewed as at least one of
the objects of the boycott or the statutory prohibition would be
rendered meaningless. The union must take responsibility for
the "forseeable consequences" of its conduct.
8 6
Finally, the Court refused to create a "large and undefinable
exception" to section 8(b)(4)'s prohibition of secondary conduct
for "political" boycotts. First, the Court interpreted Congres-
sional history as supporting a broad application of section 8(b)(4).
Despite criticisms that the secondary boycott provisions as drafted
were too broad, Congress enacted section 8(b)(4) to prohibit all
84. 102 S.Ct. at 1662-63. The Court did not address the issue whether such conduct
constituted a "labor dispute," but rather emphasized that the Congressional purpose be-
hind § 8(b)(4) was to shield "unoffending employers and others from pressures in contro-
versies not their own." Id. at 1663, n.20 (citing NLRB v. Denver Building Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)).
85. 102 S.Ct. at 1663.
86. Id. (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 614 n.9 (1980)).
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secondary boycotts "bad," as well as "good"87 in order to protect
"the helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at
all."88 Second, the Court reasoned that a distinction between boy-
cotts undertaken for labor objectives and those pursued for "polit-
ical" ends would be unworkable and difficult to make in many
cases. In declining to treat union concerted action for political
aims more leniently than a traditional labor dispute." It went fur-
ther to agree with the Court of Appeals that it is "more rather than
less objectionable that a national labor union has chosen to mar-
shall against neutral parties the considerable power, derived from
its locals and itself under the federal labor laws in aid of a random
political objective far removed from what has traditionally been
thought to be the realm of legitimate union activity."89
B. The Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Presence of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Many of the hybrid cases litigated in federal courts have in-
volved injunctions sought by employers faced with work stop-
pages in violation of no-strike promises contained in the collective
bargaining agreements. The Supreme Court's holding in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 77090 has provided re-
dress for such employers by stipulating that in certain situations
the employer faced with a breach of a no-strike provision may
seek an injunction and an order to arbitrate the grievance over
which the union is striking.
In contrast with the reference to labor dispute in section 2(9) of
the NLRA, which confers jurisdiction on a federal agency to rem-
edy unfair labor practices, the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents
federal courts from issuing injunctions against labor disputes.91
Section 13(c) of the Act defines labor dispute as follows:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the associa-
tion or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 92
87. 102 S.Ct. at 1664, n.23.
88. Id. at 1664 (citing H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947)).
89. Id. at 1664 (citing 640 F.2d at 1378).
90. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
91. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
92. Id. § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
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Section 4(a) incorporates the term labor dispute in establishing the
general limitations on federal courts:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to pro-
hibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing. . . any
of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any
work or to remain in any relation of employment.
93
While this general restriction on federal court injunctions remains
effective today, a union's work stoppage in the face of a collective
bargaining agreement containing a union no-strike promise, to-
gether with an employer's agreement to submit certain disputes to
binding abritration, may permit a Boys Markets injunction 94 to
issue if the dispute is arbitrable under the criteria established in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers.95
1. Non-Arbitrability
Although the inquiry into the scope of judicial power over la-
bor disputes under the Norris-LaGuardia Act differs from that in
NLRA section 8(b)(4) cases, federal courts have exhibited a gen-
eral reluctance to deal with hybrid disputes in collective bargain-
ing situations. The Fifth Circuit, in United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW,9 6 denied a Boys Markets injunction for a union strike in
violation of a no-strike clause on the ground that the work stop-
page was nonarbitrable.97 Because the Boys Markets guidelines
seek to vindicate and encourage the arbitration process, the court
examined whether any arbitration award could resolve the union's
grievance. The court concluded that the union's grievance did not
arise from the employment relationship between the company and
the striking employees, but rather was motivated by opposition to
South African racial policies and resentment against the importa-
93. Id. § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
94. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Injunctive relief will be granted against a union striking
under a collective bargaining agreement containing a mandatory grievance adjustment or
arbitration procedure and an express or implied no-strike promise. Id. at 253.
95. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). A grievance is deemed to be arbitrable when the dispute and
the issues underlying it are subject to the settlement procedure and arbitration provisions
provided by the contract between the union and employer.
96. 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 526 F.2d 376, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910
(1976). The Supreme Court, in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397
(1976), cited U.S Steel as "in accord" with the Second Circuit decision affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge. 428 U.S. at 404 n.9.
97. 519 F.2d at 1248.
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tion of coal produced by cheap labor.98 Thus, the court was pow-
erless to order arbitration over a subject beyond the scope of the
traditional labor dispute between an employer and a union aimed
at such a distant third party.99
Under U.S Steel, a union that is dissatisfied with the em-
ployer's importation of goods produced at substandard wages can
halt work with impunity as long as the dispute is deemed nonarbi-
trable under the Buffalo Forge principles.'00 This result stems
from the concern voiced in Ocean Shioping that disputes ex-
tending in purpose or effect beyond the jurisdictional contacts of
the federal courts cannot be brought under the equity power of the
federal judiciary.' 0 1 Consequently, the effect of finding a contro-
versy to be nonarbitrable under the Norris-LaGuardia Act will be
a denial of an injunction in the hybrid dispute, despite the fact
that there is a binding collective bargaining agreement containing
a no-strike provision.
2. The Role of the Labor Dispute Under Norris-LaGuardia
Although the initial interpretive analysis under the Norris-La-
Guardia Act parallels that under the secondary boycott provisions
of the NLRA, the effects of finding no labor dispute in the hybrid
case may cause a radically different result. Because the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's anti-injunctive provisions are dependent on the
existence of a labor dispute, if no labor dispute is present, the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act does not apply, and an injunction may issue.
Thus, the courts may disregard the Boys Markets considerations
and avoid issues of nonarbitrability.
The courts, however, have had considerable difficulty affecting
their conclusions that neither a labor dispute nor an arbitrable is-
sue exists. There are two possible outcomes which can be posited
for the hybrid case under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. First, a
court may conclude that no labor dispute exists and that the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition does not apply. The court then
may award damages or issue an injunction based on a breach of
contract theory, asserting federal court jurisdiction to administer
contractual disputes under Section 301(a) of the Labor Manage-
98. Id. at 1247-48.
99. The court made no reference to the definition of labor dispute but rather referred
the parties to an alternative remedy for a secondary boycott through a § 10(1) injunction or
a Taft-Hartley § 303 damage suit. 519 F.2d at 1247 n.23.
100. See supra note 78.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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ment Relations Act. 112
In West Gulf Maritime Association v. LA ,l°3 the court was
asked to decide "in the face of repeated admissions of Defendants
that no [labor] dispute exist[ed],"'' whether a federal court was
prohibited from issuing an injunction to enjoin a union's violation
of a no-strike promise in a collective bargaining agreement.10 5
The court permitted an injunction to issue on the ground that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition was inapplicable where the
union was arguing only a political issue and no labor dispute ex-
isted. 106 The court based its holding on a breach of contract the-
ory, concluding that equity favored the plaintiffs who faced
irreparable harm, while the union was not likely to be injured
financially by the injunction. In addition, the court deemed an
injunction to be serving the "public interest in upholding and en-
forcing valid contracts."' 07
The alternative, and now authoritative, approach to the hybrid
case produces a vastly different result. In Jacksonville Bulk Termi-
nals, Inc. v. 1L.4,108 a case arising out of the same controversy as
that in Allied InternationalI0 9 the Supreme Court held that the dis-
pute, in hybrid cases, over whether a no-strike pledge either for-
bids or permits a work stoppage will be a labor dispute,
notwithstanding the presence of an underlying nonlabor dispute
with another entity.1 0 The Court concluded that "[u]nder our de-
cisions in Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying
dispute is not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive
relief pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the strike
102. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
103. 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), rummarily a j'd, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976).
104. Id, at 375.
105. The ILA, in response to the large grain sale agreements concluded between the
USSR and the United States, became concerned with the future price for grain products in
this country. A union convention adopted a resolution on July 21,1975 which provided that
the ILA would "refuse to load grain destined for the USSR unless and until the President
of the ILA is satisfied that the interests of the American public are adequately protected."
413 F. Supp. at 376.
106. Id. at 375-76.
107. Id. at 375.
108. 102 S.Ct. 2673 (1982).
109. See supra notes 23-32 & 61-63 and accompanying text.
110. 102 S.Ct. at 2680.
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under the collective-bargaining agreement."' 1 I
Thus, the definition of labor dispute is broadened to include
any use of economic weaponry typical of union action, irrespec-
tive of the union's objectives. The arbitrability test is confined to
an inquiry of whether the union's objectives are directed toward a
party subject to the collective bargaining provisions and the arbi-
trator's jurisdiction.
III. THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The antitrust laws are designed generally to prevent business
and commercial restraints which restrict production, raise prices,
or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers and
consumers of goods and services. 112 Consequently, many groups
seeking political change through boycotts have been the subject of
antitrust complaints because of the adverse economic impact
which these activities have on third parties and the free flow of
interstate commerce.1 13 The exercise of free political expression,
however, has been safeguarded by a restriction of the antitrust
laws to the province for which the courts deemed they were in-
tended--commercial activities and restraints of trade by capital
enterprises. From this expansive precept, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act 114 with an eye to
its congressional intent and has narrowed its scope in two major
ways.
Under United States v. Hutcheson,II5 the antitrust laws have
been restricted to exclude labor disputes." 6 Unions, therefore,
have been allowed latitude under the labor exemption to engage
I 11. Id. at 2687.
112. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Allied Int'l v. ILA, 492 F.
Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'd in part, 640 F.2d 1368 (Ist Cir. 1981).
113. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n,
274 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Lawlor v.
Loewe (Danbury Hatter's case), 235 U.S. 522 (1915); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908);
Bird, supra note 7; Note, supra note 7. See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS AcT 1947, at 428 (1948):
[Section 8(b)(4)] makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in the
type of secondary boycott that has been conducted in New York City by local No.
3 of the IBEW, whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products of
manufacturers employing electricians who are members of some labor organiza-
tion other than local No. 3.
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
115. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
116. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32:463
THE HYBRID DISPUTE
in strikes, boycotts, and other activities, as long as the union acts
in its own self-interest. 17 Additionally, the Sherman Act has been
narrowed to exclude select group actions involving petitioning of
government or directed towards encouraging law enforcement.11 8
Thus, any boycott by a union organization will raise issues con-
cerning the impact of this concerted action on trade and the possi-
bility of qualified union immunity to the antitrust laws. 19
A. The Labor Exemption and the Hutcheson Formula
Organized labor's action on political issues removed from the
traditional union context presents an unusual and often compet-
ing blend of antitrust and labor concerns. Unions seeking polit-
ical change through boycott action can be the subject of antitrust
complaints because of the adverse economic effects on the free
flow of interstate commerce which these activities produce. Prior
to enactment of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, union
boycotts and strikes frequently were enjoined as restraints of trade
under the Sherman Act. The Hutcheson "labor exemption" to the
antitrust laws was the Supreme Court's attempt to harmonize fed-
eral labor and antitrust policy objectives. As a result, unions have
the latitude to engage in collective action with anti-competitive
117. See Sovem, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13
LAB. L.J. 957 (1962); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: the Application ofAnti-
trust Standards to UnionActivities, 73 YALE L.J. 14,36 n.96 (1963). Sovern sees duplication
of remedy problems in applying antitrust law to labor disputes, and favors the use of the
labor provisions. Where the labor laws are inapplicable, however, as in the hybrid dis-
putes, this problem is eliminated. The exclusive jurisdiction and preemption issues are also
discussed in Connell Constr. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975);
Local 189, Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
With respect to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Boys Markets problems, Winter dis-
cusses anticompetitive incentives created by collective bargaining based on employee or-
ganization along product market lines, and finds that with respect to anticompetitive
effects, the primary strike is as effective in restraining trade as the secondary boycott. See
generaily Mann, Powers & Roberts, The Accommodation Between Antitrust and Labor Law:
The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 30 LAB. L.J. 295 (1979); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective
Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 659 (1965); St. Antoine, Conneli:
Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603 (1976); Note, Cooperative
Collective Bargaining Conduct Among Trade Competitiors and the Non-Statutory Labor Ex-
emptionfrom Antitrust Liability, 9 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 477 (1978).
118. Eastern Ry. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
119. The hybrid cases, as they have been presented in the federal courts, never have
involved allegations that the union is acting with employers to restrict competition or con-
trol the product market. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local 3, International Bh'd of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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effects, so long as the union acts in its self-interest and does not
combine with nonlabor groups.
1. The Decision
United States v. Hutcheson 2 ' involved the longstanding con-
troversy between the Brotherhood of Carpenters and the Machin-
ists' Union over the erection and dismantling of machinery at the
St. Louis Anheuser-Busch plant. The employer's rejection of
Carpenters' demands and the Carpenters' refusal to arbitrate pur-
suant to previous agreements prompted a strike against Anheuser-
Busch and their tenant, Gaylord Container Corporation, and a
general boycott of Anheuser-Busch beer.12" ' Gaylord was not in-
volved in the labor dispute. The Court read the Sherman Act, 22
Clayton Act,'23 and Norris-LaGuardia Act'24 together in light of
their respective congressional purposes and delineated the follow-
ing test for the issuance of injunctions under the antitrust laws:
So long as a union acts in its se/f-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under §20 [of the
Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment re-
120. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
121. Id. at 228. The indictment stated that the union picketed Gaylord and Anheuser-
Busch "bearing umbrellas and charging Anheuser-Busch, Inc., to be unfair to organized
labor .... " Id. at 238 (Stone, J., concurring). The government further alleged:
[The union] brought about a "boycott of beer brewed by Anheuser-Busch.
and of dealers in said beer throughout the United States," by distributing to mem-
bers of labor organizations and to the public at large in many states and by pub-
lished notices circulated interstate "denouncing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. as unfair to
organized labor and calling upon all union members and friends of organized
labor to refrain from purchasing and drinking said beer."
Id. at 239 (Stone, J., concurring) (quoting indictment). Both the strikes against Gaylord
and the boycott of the Anheuser-Busch beer dealers arguably would be violations of §
8(b)(4) today, unless they would fall within the "allied doctrine" or product picketing ex-
emptions. See supra note 10.
122. Section I of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
123. Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor. . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help,. . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). Section 20 of the Clayton Act reads in part: "No restraining order or
injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States... in any case. .. involv-
ing, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment .... .. 29
U.S.C. § 52 (1976) (emphasis added).
124. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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garding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness,
the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particu-
lar union activities are the means.'
2 5
The court reasoned that Congress' inclusion of the term labor
dispute in the Norris-LaGuardia Act to deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction and in the Clayton Act to declare unions not to be
conspiracies in restraint of trade, indicated a broad immunity to
be conferred on union activities. 126 In the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts, therefore, Congress exempted from the antitrust
laws "activities which had becomefamiliar incidents of union pro-
cedure. z12 7 The Hutcheson test indicates when the union is actu-
ally involved in such a procedure, as opposed to purely
commercial, social, or political action.
2. The Hybrid Dispute
In the antitrust context, the hybrid case arguably would not
fall within the Hutcheson exemption for three reasons. First,
based on the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 20 of the Clayton
Act, which applies to employment disputes, the Hutcheson test is
inapplicable to a controversy which has been defined previously
by the courts as a nonlabor dispute.1 28 Thus, the Hutcheson test
which "infused" Norris-LaGuardia's definitions of the "immu-
nized trade union activities" into the Clayton Act prohibitions
does not reach union political boycotts.
Second, the terms of the Hutcheson test do not address the type
of union conduct involved in the hybrid case because the union is
not actually working in its self-interest.12 9 In fact, the union's re-
fusal to accept jobs on ships engaged in trade with the USSR may
harmfully affect its rank and file by depriving them of opportuni-
ties and financial support. With respect to the second prong of the
Hutcheson test, combinations with nonlabor groups are not indi-
125. 312 U.S. at 232 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 235.
127. Id. at 237 (emphasis added). See Local 189, Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (controversies about which employers and unions
are required to bargain exempted from antitrust laws).
128. See supra notes 39-49 & 74-94 and accompanying text.
129. See Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 403
(C.D. Cal. 1976). Accord H.A. Artists & Assocs. Inc. v. Actors Equity Ass'n, 478 F. Supp.
496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (conduct considered to be in the union's self-interest if the acts
bear a "reasonable relationship to a legitimate union interest"). See also Cox, Labor and
the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Cox, Labor and
the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv. 317 (1966).
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cated in the hybrid dispute. 130
Third, the hybrid case involves activities with objectives that
are not familiar incidents of union procedure. The Supreme
Court has interpreted Norris-LaGuadia and the Clayton Act to
protect a class of traditional union agitation defined according to
union self-interest motivations-a category removed from the hy-
brid use. Moreover, American history and law has never deemed
political disputes to be "traditional union activities."'' If union
procedure, however, were to be interpreted with reference to tradi-
tional union tactics, such as work stoppages, the hybrid case
would involve familiar incidents of union procedure. The basis of
the labor exemption, however, is premised on the purpose of the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. Since these laws were
designed to address labor conflicts, and not political disputes, a
conclusion more consistent with the legislative mandate would ex-
clude political conduct from the labor exemption.
Another guideline for determining whether union conduct is
excluded under the labor exemption was offered by the Supreme
Court in Local 189, Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel
Tea.'32 Jewel Tea questioned whether the subject of the union's
work stoppage-political dissatisfaction or anti-Soviet, anti-Ira-
nian, or anti-South African animus-falls within that class of
mandatory subjects about which employers must bargain. Ana-
lyzing the case under provisions of the NLRA, and not Norris-
LaGuardia, the Court concluded that if the subject requires bar-
gaining, the union conduct is exempt from the Sherman Act.
133
Since the cases interpreting labor disputes, in a hybrid context
exclude political activity from the provisions of the NLRA, such
activity would a fortiori fail the more narrow test for a mandatory
130. A suit by an individual worker against a union might constitute a labor dispute if
a boycott resulted in a substantial loss ofjobs and work assignments and created economic
detriment to the individual workers. Such a claim may be a labor dispute since it affects
the employees' job rights and security. Such a controversy, however, probably would not
involve an arbitrable issue because arbitration is a mechanism for resolving disputes be-
tween an employer and its employees. This situation arguably could involve a breach of a
union's duty of fair representation. See Note, Can Negligent Representation Be Fair Repre-
sentation: An Alternative Approach to Gross Negligence Analysis, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
537 0980).
131. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 492 F. Supp. at 338.
132. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
133. Id. at 689-91. Unfair labor practices include a reusal to bargain collectively with
respect to "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. §§
158(c)(5), (b)(3), 159(a) (1976). See also NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
(standards for mandatory versus permissive subjects of bargaining defined).
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subject of bargaining. That political disputes involve issues
deemed nonarbitrable under US. Steel 34 also indicates that they
fall outside-of the traditional concerns of institutions designed to
resolve labor controversies, and thus are not to be afforded con-
gressional immunization from the antitrust laws.
Under Jewel Tea, therefore, traditional union action is consid-
ered a restraint of trade when the union demand, if ignored, will
not affect the wages or hours of workers. In such a case, the union
grievance is so attenuated from work conditions that a work stop-
page is an unreasonable restraint on the employer's free operation
of production.'35 In theory, however, where a union demand is
not concerned with a labor dispute qua labor dispute, there ought
to be no impact on the employer, since it can be assumed that an
employer's only nexus with the union is in employment related
matters. In the hybrid case, therefore, if the employer can acquire
other workers and carry on its business despite the concerted ac-
tion, there would be no trade restraints.1
36
In an ongoing employment relationship, however, such as that
present in U.S. Steel where there was a work stoppage that in-
cluded a walk-out, work refusals, and picketing of the employer's
headquarters, the hybrid dispute poses the possibility of economic
detriment, production slowdown, and hampering of the em-
ployer's capacity to continue business as usual.137 Such an em-
ployer may have an exceedingly difficult time recruiting nonunion
personnel to replace the striking workers. Moreover, the highly
visible nature of this protest strike probably would result in other
workers refusing to cross the picket line to make deliveries or per-
form adjunct services necessary to the plaintiffs continued
operation.
In the cases involving the ILA's protest and directives ordering
work stoppages on Russian ships, the strikes consisted of "imme-
diate suspension in handling all Russian ships and all Russian
cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA
workers are employed."' 38 The order applied to all vessels and all
cargoes including grain, foods, and other valuable general
134. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
135. 381 U.S. at 693 n.6.
136. See Walsh v. ILA, 488 F. Supp. 524, 530 (D. Mass. 1980).
137. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975). The work stop-
page occurring on June 17, 1974 caused a loss to the plaintiff of over $4,000 for each shift.
Id. at 1240 n.5.
138. 488 F. Supp. at 526 n.l.
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freight.' 39 These cases seem germane to antitrust sanctions, given
that the terms of the labor exemption do not apply literally to the
hybrid dispute. Furthermore, the restraints on trade produced by
such work stoppages have been severe, even though the union has
not intentionally restrained the primary employer. Thus, the use
of traditional labor tactics, which in other contexts are protected
activity, does not affect the narrower scope of the antitrust exemp-
tion which excludes the hybrid case.
B. The Political Activity Exemption to the Antitrust Laws
The Supreme Court has narrowed the application of the Sher-
man Act to exclude select group actions involving petitioning of
governments or encouraging law enforcement, despite admitted
competitive motives. To the extent that federal courts exempt hy-
brid conduct from the antitrust laws under a political conduct ex-
ception rather than the classic labor exemption, the issue shifts to
whether this exemption sweeps so broadly as to encompass the
union boycott with nonunion political motivations.
1. The Noerr Doctrine
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 140 a trucking group sued a group of railroads under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act' 4 ' for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act.142 Seeking treble damages and injunctive relief,
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants conducted a publicity
campaign against the truckers to persuade the state government to
adopt laws destructive to the trucking industry and distributed in-
formation designed "to create an atmosphere of distaste for the
truckers. . . and to impair the relationships existing between the
truckers and their customers."' 143 The truckers also claimed, and
139. Id.
140. 365 U.S. 127 (1960).
141. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue in any district court of the United
States ..., and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
142. For the text of the relevant portion of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see infra note 105.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
143. 365 U.S. at 129.
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the railroads admitted, that the campaign was motivated by a de-
sire to destroy the truckers as competitors in the long-distance
freight business. 1"
The Supreme Court held that a malicious publicity campaign,
affected through dissemination of disparaging information, to-
gether with the exertion of pressure on the legislature designed to
destroy a competitor's business, was not a violation of the Sher-
man Act. 145 The Noerr holding is premised on statutory interpre-
tation and the desire to facilitate democratic decisionmaking by
promoting the free and efficient flow of information to the legisla-
ture. This structural concern with the preservation of democracy,
combined with the Sherman Act's purpose to regulate business ac-
tivity and not political action, led to the Noerr doctrine: "[T]he
Sherman Act does not apply to the activities of the [defendant] at
least insofar as those activities comprised mere solicitation of gov-
ernment action with respect to the passage and enforcement of
laws."'46
2. Essential Dissimilarity
The Court in Noerr reasoned that when a group's activity is
directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality is not
affected by any anticompetitive purpose. 47  In determining
whether the railroads were seeking governmental action, the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 136-37.
146. Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
147. But cf. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945). Hunt held that a refusal to accept
employment because of personal distaste for the employer was not a violation of the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 823. During a previous strike of the plaintiffs operation, a union member
had been killed, and a member of plaintiffs partnership was tried for and acquitted of
homicide. The basis of the complaint was that the union's refusal to sell its services to the
employer prevented him from obtaining any other truck hauling contracts in the state.
Although the court acknowledged the union's ability and purpose to damage the corpora-
tion by its refusal to accept employment, the Sherman Act did not extend to such conduct.
Justice Roberts, dissenting, argued that a union's express purpose to drive an employer
out of the business as an interstate motor carrier and the elimination of competition be-
tween such carriers which resulted from the workers' agreement fell within the Sherman
Act prohibitions. Id. at 826.
While an anticompetitive effect was established in Walsh because shippers were forced
to repudiate transport agreements, cancel several loading calls, and reroute their scheduled
deliveries for United States ports to Canada, the majority of hybrid cases involve no an-
ticompetitive animus. See, eg., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. ILA, 102 S.Ct. 2673
(1982); ILA v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 1656 (1982); Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445 (5th
Cir. 1980); Walsh v. ILA, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass.), vacated sub nom Walsh v. AFL-
CIO Local 799, 630 F.2d 864 (lst Cir. 1980).
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Court focused on the "essential dissimilarity"14 8 between agree-
ments to seek legislation or law enforcement and those combina-
tions normally held violative of the Sherman Act. 149 The hybrid
case generally does not involve proposed legislation or lobbying
input. In cases such as U.S. Steel and the Russian and Iranian
boycotts, however, the union may have attempted to influence
either the executive's foreign policy or the legislature's position on
the importation of certain goods.' 50
Noerr, however, involved legal government petitioning which
sought to achieve illegal anti-competitive restraints. Thus, Noerr
could be read as only protecting legitimate means and as regard-
ing motive as irrelevant. Assuming Noerr can be interpreted in
this fashion, hybrid conduct would not be exempted from the anti-
trust laws. An antitrust exemption for hybrid conduct would fail
because such conduct involves a legally questionable means-the
withdrawal of labor-to achieve a legitimate political end. Ignor-
ing the legitimate end, Noerr would not protect the possibly illegal
means use in a hybrid dispute.
In West 6Wf Maritime Association v. ILA,, the Longshore-
men's Association's resolution, mandating for the boycott of grain
destined for the USSR, stipulated that concerted action would
148. 365 U.S. at 136.
149. "[A]greement[s] or understanding[s] that the participants will jointly give up their
trade freedom, or help one another to take away the trade freedom of others through the
use of such devices as price-fixing agreements, boycotts, market-division agreements, and
other similar agreements." Id. (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491-493
(1940)) (emphasis added).
150. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (discussion of
the presumption against implied exclusions from the antitrust laws). Lafayette cited UMW
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965) for the following proposition:
[R]egardless of the anticompetitive purpose or effect on small competing mining
companies, the joint action of certain large mining companies and labor unions in
lobbying before the Secretary of Labor in favor of legislation establishing a mini-
mum wage for employees of contractors selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority and in lobbying before TVA to avoid coal purchases exempted from the
legislation was not subject to antitrust attack. Cases subsequent to Pennington
have emphasized the possible constitutional infirmity in the antitrust laws that a
contrary construction would entail in light of the serious threat to First Amend-
ment freedoms that would have been presented.
435 U.S. at 399 n.17. See also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972), which held that the exercise of first amendment rights of access to adminis-
trative agencies and courts are not immune from the antitrust laws when the sole purpose is
to eliminate a license applicant as a competitor. Pennington, however, still involved the
means sanctioned by Noerr-union lobbying and the petitioning of government institu-
tions for political change.
151. 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), summarily a)'d, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976).
See .supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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continue "until the interests of the American public are ade-
quately protected."' 52 Although the district court characterized
this language as indicating nothing more than a "speculative con-
cern for the future price of grain products,"' 53 in the United
States, the motives behind this particular work stoppage closely
parallel those in Noerr. Like the union in Noerr, the union in West
Gf was trying to raise public consciousness of a particular issue
and affect change through governmental processes. 54 In the hy-
brid case, however, the restraints on trade do not stem from any
future legislative provisions designed to restrain competitors, but
flow directly from the union's work stoppage. If Noerr stands for
the proposition that only political activity entailing anticompeti-
tive effects through government action is exempt, then the direct
restraints by labor unions would not be protected from the anti-
trust laws. Apparently rejecting this interpretation ofNoerr, Allied
International, Inc. v. IL,4,155 the only federal case addressing the
antitrust laws in a hybrid dispute, concluded that the political mo-
tive of the union required its conduct to be exempt.156
3. Extension of the Noerr Doctrine to Noncommercial Boycotts
A narrow reading of Noerr arguably does not exempt the hy-
brid case from antitrust sanctions. The exemption provided under
the Noerr doctrine, however, has been expanded to encompass
political boycotts by interest groups for nonanticompetitive mo-
tives. Thus, this broader reading of Noerr provides a stronger
case for excluding hybrid activity from antitrust law coverage.
a. Missouri v. National Organization for Women (NOW). In
1977, the National Organization for Women (NOW) launched a
campaign for a convention boycott of states which had not ratified
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Because NOW's organiza-
tional campaign resulted in revenue losses for the Missouri con-
vention trade and the state economy, Missouri sued NOW under
the Clayton and Sherman Acts requesting injunctive relief against
the group activities.' 57 The district court characterized the boycott
as noncommercial and not undertaken to advance the economic
152. 413 F. Supp. at 376.
153. Id. at 375.
154. For a discussion of union lobby activities and their extensive participation in the
American political processes, see supra notes 10-11.
155. 492 F. Supp. 334 (Mass. 1980), rey'd in part, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981).
156. 640 F.2d at 1380.
157. 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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self-interests of the participants. The court considered NOW's
motivation to be directed at affecting change through a govern-
mental process, i.e., ratification of a constitutional amendment.
The court also interpreted NOW's action as a symbolic gesture to
attract public attention to the ratification issue.'58
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
Sherman Act did not cover NOW's actions.'59 Citing Noerr and
discussing the the Sherman Act's legislative history, the majority
concluded that the antitrust laws were not intended to regulate
social or political activities, but rather commercial ventures with
market-oriented objectives.160 The Eighth Circuit characterized
NOW's campaign as political activity designed to persuade the
state legislature to ratify the ERA.' 6' Thus, under Noerr, this ac-
tivity was essentially dissimilar from the agreements traditionally
condemned by the Sherman Act and it involved the people's right
to freely inform and petition the government.' 62
The dissent, however, emphasized that Noerr's test for the an-
titrust exclusion does not focus on the motives of the group, but
rather on whether antitrust enforcement would impinge severely
on some fundamental national policy. According to the dissent,
Noerr is distinguishable on its facts when a group goes beyond
using a publicity campaign as a lobbying tool "and combine[s]
with others to boycott a specific, identifiable segment of a highly
competitive industry" to communicate its wishes to the legisla-
ture. 163 The dissent concluded, therefore, that a court must bal-
ance the first amendment interests with the disruptive effect on
free market competition and potential economic injury that can
flow from a particular practice.' 64
158. Id. at 295.
159. Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 1311-12.
161. Id. at 1316.
162. The court specifically distinguished Council of Defense v. International Magazine
Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920), which involved a noncommercial boycott, but did not in-
volve the use of government petitions. 620 F.2d at 1304. The dissent, however, urged that
the attempt to distinguish Council of Defense ignored an analysis which "should reckon
with the potential economic disruption produced by the manner of using economic weap-
ons as communication." Id. at 1324 n.17 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
163. 620 F.2d at 1323.
164. Id. at 1325. The first amendment implications of a judicial or statutory prohibition
on a union's political self-expression through boycotting cannot be overlooked. Cf. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting




b. The Hybrid Case under NOW. Both the majority and dis-
sent in NOW would not exempt the hybrid dispute unless such a
case involved petitioning the government through political activ-
ity. In some hybrid cases, government petitioning may be implied
from the union's attempt to pressure importers and ship owners
into influencing federal government policies. The NOW majority
would protect this activity from the antitrust laws-arguably
broadening the scope of Noerr. However, the dissent in NOW
would mandate balancing the economic harm to third parties
against the extent and nature of the political activities involved.
The dissent proposed the following standard for balancing activi-
ties unnecessarily harmful to competition against the value of
political expression:
Behavior is "unnecessarily harmful" to competition when it
is excessively dangerous without being indispensable to the
political activity. Analysis of whether conduct is indispensable
to the political activity depends upon (1) the severity of the dan-
ger to competition, (2) the availability of a less dangerous alter-
native, and (3) the customary political character of the
challenged behavior.' 65
In determining the "severity of the danger to competition," as-
suming some danger to competition in the hybrid dispute, it
would be necessary to make an extensive, empirical examination
of how union political, nonwork-related boycotts affect the com-
petitive stance of companies handling goods of an unpopular for-
eign nation. These inquiries are made routinely in antitrust
litigation and do not present insuperable difficulties for a
factfinder. As to the second factor, a "less dangerous alternative"
to the union work stoppage would be to permit the union workers
to refrain from working with products of parties with whom they
are in disagreement, while permitting replacement workers to per-
form the distasteful work. Since the hybrid work stoppage is not
designed to hurt the employer, but rather attempts to stop the
usual union business in response to a foreign actor, the alternative
is not inconsistent with a meaningful boycott. 166
165. 620 F.2d at 1324 n.14 (citing Book Review, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 19, 23 n.36 (1979),
which restates the standard proposed in I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, 205 (1978). See also
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397 0950) ("no absolutist test in
weighing when harmful conduct and substantial interests of society can justify restrictions
upon speech").
166. A distinction must be made, however, between the case where a union stops work
because of personal choice to avoid commingling with politically distasteful employers and
where a union seeks to pressure an employer to cease handling certain goods. In the first
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Under the third factor, the character of the challenged behav-
ior in the hybrid case is undisputedly not "customarily political."
The withdrawal of manpower as a pressure tactic is decidedly in-
tertwined with the rights of unions to use economic self-help to
bargain collectively and improve conditions of employment. Fi-
nally, the dissent suggests that the difference in the potential ex-
tent of economic and anticompetitive injury between primary and
secondary boycotts is relevant in politically motivated boycotts.167
Noting that this distinction has been important in delineating pro-
tected from unprotected activity in other noncommerical contexts,
such as labor disputes, 68 the dissent suggests that this distinction
also might be an appropriate consideration in a political boycott
situation.
Thus, the dissent's inquiry evaluates the extenuated economic
impact of a secondary boycott to determine whether a labor
union's politically motivated work stoppage is in fact secon-
dary. 169 If the hybrid case is secondary conduct, the union would
not be in violation of Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA because of
jurisdictional deficiencies. Arguably, however, under an antitrust
analysis, the severe economic impact of secondary boycotts would
militate for applying the Sherman Act to the hybrid dispute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The hybrid dispute employs the selected means of work stop-
pages and refusals to deal which are economically destructive, not
covered by the NLRA or Norris-LaGuardia Act, and not directed
in their simple form toward institutional change. The ends sought
in a hybrid case are removed from the workers terms and condi-
tions of employment, are not usually focused on immediate do-
mestic policymaking or law enforcement (though it may have
impact on governmental consensus), and involves issues nonarbi-
trable and noncognizable by arbitrators and federal courts.
There is an inherent inconsistency in declining to view the
concerted action of a work stoppage as a labor dispute and not
permitting the application of the antitrust laws. The current judi-
cial reluctance to apply either the labor or the antitrust laws to the
case, replacement workers are appropriate. In the latter, replacement workers would
render the boycott meaningless.
167. 620 F.2d at 1325 n.19. See Bird, supra note 7, at 253; Note, supra note 7, at 178, 181,
190.
168. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
169. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
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hybrid dispute, however, possibly could be supported with first
amendment analysis. Yet, interests involved in free political ex-
pression must be balanced with the harm to innocent third parties
and the need for the free flow of goods among the states.
A possible compromise would be to forbid the use of concerted
actions such as strikes or picketing for political purposes which
would prevent the employer from obtaining an alternative work
force. The union could, as any other political organization might,
organize a large-scale workers' consumer boycott. The union
would be free to continue any political protest activity on its own
time which did not use the union organizational networks to im-
pair the employer's supply of manpower. If, as the union con-
tends, the hybrid boycott is personal or political, and is not
derived from the employer-employee relationship, and is truly
based on the union's desire not to give aid and comfort to a nation
which it sees as inimical, the employer should be afforded free
access to manpower without union objections. 170 This conclusion
is supported by the analogous employer's right to rehire freely re-
placement workers when a union is engaged in a strike.
171
In sum, the courts should approach the union litigant in a hy-
brid dispute as they would any other political organization in-
volved in boycotting, thus minimizing the judicial restraint
traditionally adopted by the federal courts. Above all, if the union
political boycott is in fact unaffected by any labor or antitrust
prohibitions, the practical effects of the activities must be assessed
so that private enterprise may more effectively deal with and pre-
pare for these work stoppages through private contractual provi-
sions between management and unions.
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170. This solution would be satisfactory, as long as the temporary work force does not
impair any workers' rights such as existing seniority or a right to reinstatement.
171. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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